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1ESSAY: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND WAR CRIMES BY GUERILLAS 
When directed, United States Special Operations Forces conduct unconventional 
warfare or foreign internal defense missions.  These operations include tasks to train, 
equip, and advise friendly foreign indigenous forces – guerillas.1 By statute, doctrine, 
and training, Special Operations Forces (“SOF”) must conduct operations in compliance 
with the law of armed conflict.2 If U.S. service members violate these laws, U.S. military 
authorities investigate the incident and prosecute the violators under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.3 But what happens when U.S. forces provide military assistance to 
guerillas that committed or are likely to commit war crimes?   
 Some scholars indicate that U.S. forces might be criminally liable for the 
guerillas’ war crimes under command responsibility theory.4 One specifically reviewed a 
SOF team’s 2002 operations with Northern Alliance guerillas against the Taliban and Al 
Qaida in Afghanistan.5 There were news reports that some Northern Alliance groups had 
mistreated and even caused the deaths of numerous Taliban and Al Qaida prisoners.  The 
 
1 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS; JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.1, JOINT 
DOCTRINE FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE.
2 Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, (May 9, 2006); Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy, Ethical Dilemmas for Special Forces, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University (June 2003). 
3 See, e.g., United States v Calley, 48 CMR 19 (1973).  
4 Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AJIL 573 (Jul 1999); Francis 
Boyle, Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision:  Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AJIL 86 (Jan 1987).   
5 Jennifer Lane, Comment, The Mass Graves at Dasht-e Leili: Assessing U.S. Liability for Human Rights 
Violations During the War in Afghanistan, 34 Cal W Int’l L J 145 (Fall 2003). 
2author opined that a SOF team in the vicinity had a general legal duty under command 
responsibility theory to investigate any rumors of Northern Alliance war crimes and to 
intervene to prevent any crimes. 
 This essay assesses if SOF teams have such duties under the law of armed conflict 
as interpreted by war crimes jurisprudence.  It does not address duties imposed by 
domestic statutes or regulations.  Also, given the breadth of this topic, the essay’s 
analysis focuses on the duties of SOF teams in the field – their tactical actions – and not 
those of higher, strategic or policy level decision makers.  It is limited to the following 
scenario.  A SOF team deploys into a foreign country in either a permissive or non-
permissive environment with the mission to train, equip, advise, and even lead – in 
varying degrees – friendly guerillas in combat.  Before deploying, the team knows of 
general rumors that some of the guerilla groups have committed acts that may constitute 
serious violations of the Law of Armed Conflict.  While deployed and providing military 
assistance, the team hears rumors that the guerilla group with whom they are working 
might be committing war crimes.  No members of the SOF team directly witness or 
participate in any war crimes. 
 In this context, this essay first analyzes a SOF team’s liability and duties under 
command responsibility theory – specifically, whether a SOF team’s ability to influence 
the guerillas really amounts to “effective control.”  Then, it considers the team’s potential 
criminal liability under theories that do not require effective control.  Finally, this essay 
discusses the implications of these theories on a SOF team’s duties to investigate, report, 
intervene, or detach from guerillas.  Recognizing the developmental link between 
international and domestic war crimes law, it draws examples from recent U.S. law, the 
3International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).  
Based on these sources, this analysis concludes that SOF teams generally have no legal 
duty under the Law of Armed Conflict to investigate the past war crimes of guerillas or to 
intervene to stop their future ones.  But they have strong moral, ethical, and even 
practical motives to do so. 
 
I.  GUERRILLA WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY THEORY 
For over fifty years, United States courts and international tribunals have applied 
command responsibility theory to hold commanders responsible for crimes by soldiers or 
others under their control.  The modern doctrine dates from the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
war crimes trials after World War II.6 But the most recent and comprehensive 
consideration of the theory occurred in the ICTY’s Celebici Judgment, which concerned 
atrocities committed by Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces against Bosnian Serbs in a 
prisoner camp. 7 Regardless of the forum, the doctrinal questions for command 
responsibility are the same - where a crime is committed by a subordinate, under what 
circumstances is the superior liable and who is a superior?  Specifically, the theory has a 
common formulation that requires three elements:  1) a superior / subordinate 
 
6 See, e.g., In re: Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1946); United States v. Rockwood, 52 MJ 98 (1999); Beth Van 
Schaack, Essay, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of Proof in Romagoza v. Garcia, 36 UC Davis L 
Rev (June 2003); Michal Stryszak, Command Responsibility:  How Much Should a Commander be 
Expected to Know?, 11 USAFA J Leg Stud 27 (2000/2001). 
7 Andrew D. Mitchell, Failure to Halt, Prevent, or Punish:  The Doctrine of Command Responsibility for 
War Crimes, 22 Sydney L Rev 381 (Sept 2000). 
4relationship, 2) knowledge, actual or constructive, by the superior of the crimes 
committed by the subordinate, and 3) failure by the superior to halt, prevent, or punish 
the subordinate.8 Significantly, command responsibility theory creates liability for two 
types of conduct:  positive acts and omissions, where there exists a legal duty to act.9
A.  COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY THEORY’S DOMINANT FIRST ELEMENT –
WHETHER A DEFENDANT HAD “EFFECTIVE CONTROL”
OVER THE PERPETRATORS OF THE WAR CRIMES 
Under command responsibility theory, a court will likely first determine whether 
the evidence satisfies the superior / subordinate relationship element. Among the three 
elements, the proof of a superior / subordinate relationship will effectively drive any 
court’s consideration of the second and third elements.  In other words, the existence or 
nature of an alleged superior / subordinate relationship will determine if an individual had 
the requisite mental state under command responsibility theory - what he or she knew or 
“should have known.”  Further, it will determine the existence and scope of that person’s 
duty to prevent a war crime. 
The dependency of the second two elements on the first was exemplified in the 
ICTY case The Prosecutor v. Blaskic.10 Tihomir Blaskic was a general in the Croatian 
Defence Council (“HVO”).  In his geographic area of responsibility, several Croatian 
 
8 RODNEY DIXON AND KARIM KHAN, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, PRACTICE,
PROCEDURE, & EVIDENCE, 293 (Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 2003). 
9 The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, November 16, 1998, paras. 395-
398 (affirmed by the Appeals Chamber on Feb. 20, 2001). 
10 The Prosector v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, March 3, 2000 (affirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber on July 29, 2004). 
5police and paramilitary units had committed atrocities against Bosnian Muslim civilians 
and property.  General Blaskic was charged with these war crimes based on command 
responsibility under the ICTY Statute, Article 7(3). 
The Trial Chamber considered General Blaskic’s mental state entirely within the 
context of its analysis of his command relationship to the police and paramilitary forces 
that committed the crimes.  It noted that Article 7(3) had a mens rea element that required 
proof that General Blaskic had either actual knowledge or had reason to know of crimes 
being committed by troops under his control.11 For actual knowledge, the Trial Chamber 
stated, “an individual’s command position per se is a significant indicium that he knew 
about the crimes committed by his subordinates.”  For constructive knowledge, the Trial 
Chamber opined that General Blaskic’s duty to know their crimes stemmed directly from 
his superior / subordinate relationship to the troops.  It quoted the Celebici Trial 
Chamber: 
A superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific 
information was in fact available to him which would provide notice of 
offences, committed by his subordinates. This information need not be 
such that it by itself was sufficient to compel the conclusion of the 
existence of such crimes.  It is sufficient that the superior was put on 
further inquiry by the information, or, in other words, that it indicated the 
need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences 
were being committed or about to be committed by his subordinates.12 
Because the Blaskic Trial Chamber concluded that General Blaskic was a regional 
commander with some authority over the paramilitary and police forces in his geographic 
area of responsibility, it held that he had a duty to know – should have known - about 
their crimes.   
 
11 Id. at paras. 307-310. 
12 Id. at para. 310, quoting Delalic, IT-96-21-Tat para. 393 (emphasis added). 
6The Trial Chamber also considered the third element of command responsibility 
theory – whether General Blaskic took necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or 
punish the war crimes – entirely within the context of its examination of the superior / 
subordinate relationship.13 The Chamber opined, “[I]t is a commander’s degree of 
effective control, his material ability, which will guide the Trial Chamber in determining 
whether he reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to punish 
the perpetrator.”14 Again, the Trial Chamber focused on the facts of General Blaskic’s 
relationship to the paramilitary and police forces that committed the crimes.  He claimed 
that those forces reported to a higher authority in the hierarchy and therefore that he did 
not directly control them and could not take any measures to prevent their crimes.  
However, the Trial Chamber ruled that General Blaskic was still the superior of those 
forces within a hierarchy and therefore had a duty to report their atrocities. 
 Thus, the existence of a superior / subordinate relationship is an indispensable 
prerequisite to liability under command responsibility theory.  It defines the scope and 
nature of an individual’s imputed knowledge and duty to intervene.  An individual may 
have knowledge of the war crimes being committed by others and fail to act to prevent 
them, but without a superior / subordinate relationship, he will not be liable for the war 
crimes under this theory.  Accordingly, in the context of this essay’s hypothetical 
scenario, the dispositive issue for a SOF team’s liability under command responsibility 
theory is whether the team has a superior / subordinate relationship with the guerillas. 
 
13 Id. at paras. 333-336. 
14 Id. at paras. 335, citing Delalic, IT-96-21-Tpara. 395. 
7B. THE SUPERIOR / SUBORDINATE STANDARD REQUIRES EFFECTIVE CONTROL,
NOT MERELY THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE 
The standard for a superior / subordinate relationship is “effective command and 
control,” which means that an individual has the material ability to prevent and punish 
the commission of the alleged offenses.15 Significantly, the relationship can exist either 
de jure or de facto. An individual’s title as commander or lack thereof is not dispositive.  
Article 28 of the ICC summarizes the terms of command responsibility theory developed 
in international war crimes jurisprudence: 
A military commander or a person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be held criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may 
be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control proper over such 
forces. . . .16 
The ICTY cases concerning command responsibility offer the most recent and 
comprehensive analyses of this standard. 
 In the Celebici Judgment - the ICTY considered whether three individuals - Zejnil 
Delalic, Zcravko Mucic, and Hazim Delic - had effective control over prison guards who 
committed numerous atrocities in 1992 against Serbians held at the Celebici prison 
 
15 Delalic, IT-96-21-T at para. 283. 
16 The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 
art. 28; DIXON AND KHAN, supra note 8, at 293.  Of note, the United States is not and does not intend to 
become a party to the Rome Statute.  U.S. Department of State Press Statement, International Criminal 
Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, May 6, 2002 (available at 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm).  
8camp.17 Mucic was the alleged commander of the camp. Delalic was the commander of 
military forces in Konjic, Bosnia, where the camp was located.  Lastly, Delic was 
Mucic’s deputy commander of the camp.  The Trial Chamber first considered whether 
each had de jure authority over the guards.  It examined legislation, laws, written 
policies, and written orders for definitions of their authority and of a hierarchy that 
included the defendants and the guards.  Then, the Trial Chamber analyzed whether a de 
facto relationship existed between the Celebici defendants and the prison guards – 
whether they had effective control over the guards.  The Trial Chamber considered a 
variety of factors:  the distribution of tasks within the unit; the capacity to issue orders; 
any previous exercise of disciplinary measures by the defendants; and lastly the 
defendant’s powers of influence.  Significantly, it distinguished between influence and 
effective control, indicating that influence alone does not establish a superior / 
subordinate relationship.  An individual is criminally liable under command 
responsibility theory only to the extent that he fails to exert proper influence over others 
upon whom effective control already exists.18 
In Mucic’s case, the Trial Chamber ruled that he exercised de facto control over 
the individuals who committed the crimes but failed to exert proper influence to prevent 
war crimes.  The evidence included Bosnian Army documents that indicated Mucic was 
the camp commander.  Former prisoners also testified that Mucic was recognized as the 
camp commander by the prisoners and the camp guards.  Mucic argued that there were no 
 
17 Delalic, IT-96-21-T; Ann B. Ching, Comment, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in 
Light of the Celebici Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 NC J 
Int’l L & Comm Reg 167 (Fall, 1999). 
18 Bantekas, supra note 4, at 576. 
9official records showing his appointment as the camp commander and that numerous 
outside groups had access to the prisoners to abuse them.  He also argued that he had 
tried unsuccessfully to prevent the abuse of the prisoners.  The Trial Chamber rejected 
Mucic’s arguments, declaring, “Where there is de facto control and actual exercise of 
command, the absence of a de jure authority is irrelevant to the question of the superior’s 
criminal responsibility for the criminal acts of his subordinates.”19 Accordingly, the Trial 
Chamber held that Mucic’s poor attempts to protect the prisoners demonstrated that he 
had some control over the prison guards. 
 In contrast, the Trial Chamber ruled that Delalic was not a de facto superior of the 
prison guards at Celebici and distinguished between influence and effective control.  It 
focused on Delalic’s functions and activities as the regional coordinator for forces in 
Konjic area and as the appointed commander of Tactical Group I.20 The Chamber found 
that as a coordinator, Delalic’s duties consisted of “mediation and conciliation” and that 
he had “his functions prescribed.”  It noted that the position of coordinator was not 
recognized in the Bosnian Army and that it did not place Delalic in a military chain of 
command.  Rather, he acted as a mediator between military and civilian groups in the 
Bosnian government, facilitated the distribution of supplies, and exercised no 
independent judgment.  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber held that Delalic’s job as a 
coordinator did not make him a superior of the prison guards.  Concerning his post as the 
commander of Tactical Group I, the Chamber noted that the unit was a temporary combat 
 
19 Delalic, IT-96-21-T at para. 736. 
20 Id. at para. 700; Ching, supra note 16, at 196 (cited in note 16). 
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unit that did not include non-combat institutions such as prisons.21 It rejected any 
inference of a superior / subordinate relationship from an order that Delalic transmitted 
from higher authority to the Celebici camp commander to appoint a commission to 
interrogate prisoners.  It emphasized that the tactical group existed only to carry out 
specific combat missions and was merely a conduit in transmitting the order.  The Trial 
Chamber therefore concluded that Delalic was not a regional commander with effective 
control over the Celebici camp. 
 Lastly, the Trial Chamber also found that Delic lacked effective control over the 
prison guards even though he was the deputy commander of the camp.22 It distinguished 
between influence and effective control.  Several witnesses testified that Delic appeared 
to be the guards’ “boss” because he gave them orders and had an apparent strong 
intimidating and coercive influence on them.  Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber held that 
Delic’s influence was merely the result of his forceful personality, which intimidated the 
guards and caused them to follow his orders.  Hence, it concluded that such influence did 
not establish that Delic had de facto effective control over the Celebici camp.   
 
C.  THE SOF TEAM / GUERILLA RELATIONSHIP: INFLUENCE VERSUS EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
The Celebici Judgment provides a useful framework to apply the effective 
control standard to this essay’s scenario to determine the liabilities and responsibilities of 
a SOF team for guerillas’ war crimes.  Logically, a SOF team has some leverage to 
attempt to influence the guerillas’ behavior beyond their performance in combat.  It 
 
21 Delalic, IT-96-21-T at paras. 708-714. 
22 Id. at paras. 795-810. 
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provides military assistance to the guerillas and can therefore threaten to influence the 
guerilla’s conduct by threatening to the assistance.  In the context of the Celebici 
Judgment analysis, does the team’s ability to influence the guerillas amount to a superior 
/ subordinate relationship from which duties of knowledge and prevention flow under 
command responsibility theory? 
 First, as with all three of the Celebici defendants, a court would be unlikely to rule 
that a SOF team exercised de jure effective control over the guerillas.  There is no 
domestic or foreign legislation that makes guerillas part of U.S. forces.  Such a 
relationship might stem from an international agreement that places a SOF team and the 
guerillas under a combined commander or within the same military hierarchy.  But this is 
an unlikely scenario especially since the guerillas are typically not fighting on behalf of 
any recognized government. 
Accordingly, a SOF team’s liability will likely depend on whether a court 
determines that it had de facto effective control over the guerillas.  As in Celebici, it is 
necessary to examine the following factors to determine whether a SOF team’s functions 
include the material ability to punish or to prevent the guerillas from committing war 
crimes:  the distribution of tasks; the capacity to issue orders; any previous exercise of 
disciplinary measures by the defendants; and lastly the SOF team’s powers of influence. 
With regard to tasks, the team members serve primarily as advisors and trainers to 
the guerillas.23 They also coordinate the delivery of military supplies requested by the 
guerillas.  In this regard, a SOF team’s tasks seem analogous to those in Delalic, where 
the primary tasks were coordination of supplies and where the court found that he lacked 
 
23 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, supra note 1; Ethical Dilemmas for Special Forces, supra note 2.  
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effective control based on such activities.  A SOF team may also direct close air support 
from U.S. aircraft against targets designated by the team.  But this concerns the direction 
of U.S. forces alone and does not imply a combined chain of command with the guerillas.   
Finally, a SOF team may exercise ad hoc, limited tactical control over movements by the 
guerillas.  But this task seems more analogous to the limited occasional control exercised 
by Delalic and Delic, than the extensive, prolonged control exercised by Mucic.  Thus, 
based on a task analysis, a court seems likely to rule, as the ICTY did with Delalic and 
Delic, that a SOF team lacks effective control over the perpetrators of the war crimes. 
A SOF team also lacks material methods to issue orders or to exercise discipline 
over the guerillas.  The SOF – guerilla relationship is a voluntary one, where the guerillas 
agree to work with a SOF team as long as the guerilla leader considers the situation to be 
beneficial.  Accordingly, the guerillas may follow ad hoc tactical orders, but only as 
allowed by the guerilla leader.  A SOF team does not function as a regional commander 
like defendant did in Blaskic where the ICTY found effective control to exist.  Further, 
the guerillas are not subject to a SOF team’s military justice mechanisms for enforcing 
discipline.  Rather, they follow the discipline of their own leaders.  In this regard, a SOF 
team is entirely dependent on the guerilla leader to enforce discipline over his troops.  
The team’s ability to issue orders and impose discipline is therefore one of influence 
alone through force of personality – as in Delalic, where the ICTY found a lack of 
effective control.  The team’s authority over the guerillas seems unlike the actual control 
that the ICTY assessed in Mucic.
Further, the team’s actual powers of influence do not indicate a material capacity 
to punish or to prevent war crimes.  A SOF team consists of only a few individuals 
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compared to the large numbers of guerillas that are being assisted.  This asymmetry in 
numbers does not demonstrate such ability.  In a physical battle to prevent a war crime, a 
SOF team would be dramatically outnumbered.  Certainly, the team can draw upon U.S. 
close air support.  But air power is not a realistic mechanism to prevent individual war 
crimes or a lawful means to punish guerillas for their violations of the Law of Armed 
Conflict.  Rather, the team’s primary leverage with the guerillas consists of threatening to 
withdraw U.S. military aid if the guerillas commit war crimes.  By doctrine, SOF teams 
are trained to make this point as a matter of standard operating procedure immediately 
upon first meeting with the guerillas.24 But as already discussed and as the ICTY held in 
Delalic, the ability to coordinate supplies – and to withhold them – does not necessarily 
mean that a SOF team has effective control over the guerillas. 
Thus, in the context of this essay’s hypothetical scenario, a SOF team does not 
have a superior / subordinate relationship with the guerillas.  Accordingly, it is unlikely to 
be criminally liable for the guerilla’s war crimes under command responsibility theory.  
And as discussed below, this theory is therefore not a potential source of legal duties for a 
SOF team in its relations with the guerillas. 
 
II.  CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORIES WITHOUT EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
Although a SOF team is unlikely to be liable under command responsibility 
theory, it could be liable under several theories which do not contain the requirement of a 
superior / subordinate relationship between the team and the guerillas.  These include 




command responsibility theory, these theories exist on the international level in the ICC 
Statute and the ICTY Statute and domestically in the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”).  Significantly, none require proof of effective control as an element to impose 
criminal liability. 
But all require proof of a higher mental element than command responsibility 
theory’s mental element.  All necessitate proof that the defendant had actual knowledge 
of the subordinates’ criminal conduct.  In contrast, command responsibility theory only 
requires proof that defendant knew or should have known – had constructive knowledge - 
about such conduct.  For aiding and abetting, the ICTY opined that under Article 7(1) of 
the statute, “The aider and abettor of persecution, as a “special intent” crime, must not 
only have knowledge of the crime he is assisting or facilitating.  He must also be aware 
that the crimes being assisted or supported are committed with discriminatory intent.”25 
For joint criminal enterprise theory, the ICTY considered that only three possible 
scenarios exist to impose criminal liability: 
1) those where all participants act pursuant to a common design and 
possess the same criminal intent; 2) those where the accused have personal 
knowledge of a system of ill-treatment and an intent to further the 
common system of ill-treatment; and 3) those where there is a common 
design to pursue a course of conduct but an act is committed outside the 
common design which is nonetheless a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the common purpose.”26 
Significantly, all scenarios require proof of the defendant’s actual knowledge of the 
subordinates’ criminal purpose and varying degrees of intentional mens rea. Laslty, 
 
25 The Prosecutor v. Kvocka, IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment at para. 262 (Nov. 2, 2001)(affirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber on Feb. 28, 2005) 
26 Id.
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conspiracy theory also has a higher mens rea requirement than “should have known.” 
There must be an agreement to commit a crime coupled with an overt act in furtherance 
thereof.27 
Domestically, the Uniform Code of Military Justice also provides for criminal 
liability in the absence of effective control but only if actual knowledge is proved.  Under 
the UCMJ, there are two general theories for vicarious or imputed criminal liability:  
principals and co-conspirators.28 Under the law of principals, an accused may be 
convicted of a substantive offense committed by the actual perpetrator if he “aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, or procured the commission of the offense. . .or caused 
an illegal act to be done.”  Under the law of conspiracy, an accused may be similarly 
convicted if crimes were done in furtherance of a conspiracy while the accused was a 
member of it.  For a conviction, both require an accused to have actual knowledge of the 
actual perpetrator’s criminal mental state or purpose.  The accused need not share the 
same criminal intent of the perpetrator under these theories, but he must intend that some 
criminal or unlawful goal would be achieved by his aiding and abetting or participating in 
the conspiracy.  
 In The Prosecutor v. Kvocka, the ICTY analyzed several aiding and abetting type 
theories (non-effective control theories) in charges against several civilians, police 
officers, and minor administrators who worked at the Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje 
Camps, where numerous atrocities were committed against Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
 
27 Richard P. Barrett and Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 Minn L Rev 30, 57-59 (November, 2003). 
28 MILITARY JUDGES BENCHBOOK, DA PAM 27-9, supra note 28, paras. 7-1 to 7-1-3. (Sept. 15, 2002). 
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in 1992.  None of the defendants were instrumental in establishing the camps or 
determining the official policies used on the detainees.  All denied any criminal intent to 
commit the atrocities and claimed that others were the actual perpetrators.  Yet, all were 
charged with individual criminal responsibility for the atrocities under Article 7(1) of the 
ICTY statute.  The prosecution’s theories were aiding and abetting and joint criminal 
enterprise.  The Trial Chamber opined: 
[W]hen a detention facility is operated in a manner which makes the 
discriminatory and persecutory intent of the operation patently clear, 
anyone who knowingly participates in any significant way in the operation 
of the facility or assists or facilitates its activity, incurs individual criminal 
responsibility for the participation in the criminal enterprise, either as a co-
perpetrator or an aider and abettor. . . .29 
The Trial Chamber continued that presence alone at the scene of a crime is not conclusive 
of aiding and abetting but that silence could be interpreted as tacit approval when it is 
coupled with some authority.  Concerning the degree of assistance, the Chamber ruled: 
The assistance or facilitation provided by the aider or abettor must of 
course have a substantial effect on the crime committed by a co-
perpetrator.  The precise threshold of participation in joint criminal 
enterprise has not been settled, but the participation must be “in some way 
. . . directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose.30 
The Trial Chamber held that the defendants’ had actual knowledge of the atrocities being 
committed by others at the camp and that through their continued participation in the 
camp’s operation, they incurred individual criminal responsibility for the crimes.31 In 
other words, it inferred that the defendants had the required criminal mental state based 
on their actual knowledge of the perpetrator’s crimes and their ongoing assistance. 
 
29 Kvocka, IT-98-30/1-T at 306.  
30 Id. at para. 289. 
31 Id. at para. 257, 328. 
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Applying these theories to this essay’s scenario, a SOF team might be criminally 
responsible for guerilla war crimes if the team had actual knowledge of the guerilla’s 
criminal purpose and intent and provided military assistance that assisted the guerillas in 
committing the crimes.  For example, if the guerillas were shooting prisoners and 
civilians and were using ammunition supplied by SOF, the team might be liable if it had 
actual knowledge of the executions and yet continued supplying the ammunition.  It 
might be argued that by doctrine and training, the team did not have any criminal intent 
or mental state or even the criminal purpose of the guerillas when it provided the 
assistance.  But as in Kvocka, a court might infer that the team had some criminal intent 
by its actual knowledge of the guerillas crimes coupled with the team’s ongoing 
participation through military assistance.  Moreover, the team need not know all the 
particulars of the guerilla’s intended crimes.  Rather, under aiding and abetting theory, a 
SOF team must simply be aware that their contribution will assist or facilitate the 
guerillas’ crimes or that guerilla crimes in general are a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of their assistance.32 
The SOF team’s defense might fairly argue that they lacked actual knowledge of 
the guerillas’ crimes and distinguish the lesser “should have known” mental state 
required under command responsibility theory.  But the team’s actual knowledge of the 
guerillas’ criminal purpose might be established from circumstantial evidence of past 
crimes.  The circumstantial evidence of the crimes must be strong enough that actual 
knowledge of the guerillas’ intentions can be imputed to the SOF team.  For example, in 
Kvocka, the Trial Chamber stated: 
 
32 See,e.g., id. at para. 262. 
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Even if the accused were not eye-witnesses to crimes committed in 
Omarska camp, evidence of abuses could be seen by observing the 
bloodied, bruised, and injured bodies of detainees, by observing heaps of 
dead bodies lying in piles around the camp, and noticing the emaciated 
and poor condition of the detainees, as well as by observing the cramped 
facilities or the bloodstained walls.33 
Accordingly, under aiding and abetting theory, rumors of guerilla war crimes would 
probably not suffice by themselves to establish circumstantial evidence of a SOF team’s 
actual knowledge.  Because the standard is knowledge and not “should have known,” 
aiding and abetting theory does not lead to a general duty for a SOF team to investigate 
the rumors.  But a team’s willful ignorance is a perilous path toward criminal 
responsibility because persistent rumors and other circumstantial evidence could be 
collectively strong enough to establish the team’s actual knowledge.34 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORIES TO SOF DUTIES 
A SOF team’s potential criminal liability is therefore unlikely under command 
responsibility theory but very possible under aiding and abetting and similar theories that 
do not require effective control but require a team to have actual knowledge of the 
guerilla’s criminal purpose and intent.  Certainly, the timing of a SOF team’s knowledge 
is an important aspect of this potential liability.  Under aiding and abetting type theories, 
liability will attach only if the teams have the above actual knowledge before providing 
or continuing to provide military aid.  With this caveat in mind, the different results in 
applying these theories lead to several important implications on a SOF team’s general 
 
33 Id. at para. 324. 
34 See,e.g., United States v. Lyons, 33 M.J. 88 (1991); MILITARY JUDGES BENCHBOOK, DA PAM 27-9, 
supra note 28, at para. 7-2. 
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legal duties in their interaction with the guerillas in the context of this essay’s factual 
scenario. 
 
A.  DUTY TO INVESTIGATE GUERILLAS’ WAR CRIMES 
First, without “effective control,” a SOF team has no general standing legal duty 
to investigate rumors of past war crimes committed by guerillas.  As already discussed, a 
SOF team must have actual knowledge of the guerillas’ past crimes for criminal liability 
to attach.  The “should have known” standard applies only within command 
responsibility theory, not within the aiding and abetting type theories.  Failure to 
investigate is therefore not a war crime in the context of this essay’s factual scenario.  But 
it would be unwise for a team to ignore rumors that could constitute circumstantial 
evidence of actual knowledge, which if linked to continuing military aid could lead to 
criminal liability under aiding and abetting type theories. 
 
B.  DUTY TO REPORT GUERILLAS’ WAR CRIMES 
Next, a SOF team has no general standing legal duty under the law of armed 
conflict to report rumors of guerillas’ past war crimes.  There are two possible avenues 
for a team to make such reports:  1) to higher authority within the U.S. Armed Forces and 
2) to the guerillas’ leadership.  Concerning the first, all U.S. military personnel are 
required by regulation to report any suspected instances of violations of the Law of 
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Armed Conflict.35 This regulatory requirement is typically incorporated into all SOF 
operational orders.  Accordingly, failure to report guerilla war crimes might lead to 
criminal liability under Article 92 of the UCMJ, “Violation of an Order or Regulation.”36 
But this type of regulatory or military crime is not a war crime under the Law of Armed 
Conflict.  For example, it is not among the war crimes in the ICC or the ICTY statutes.  
This type of crime is a domestic military criminal offense. 
 Concerning the second avenue of reporting (to the guerilla leadership), the duty to 
make this report is not required by a U.S. regulation.  Rather, it would derive from 
command responsibility theory’s third element that creates a duty for a superior to 
prevent or punish war crimes.  But as stated, a SOF team is unlikely to be liable under 
this theory because it does not effectively control the guerillas.  Further, under aiding and 
abetting type theories, there is no element that directly requires reports of crimes, but the 
existence or lack of such reports are certainly probative evidence about whether a team 
shared the guerillas’ criminal purpose and intent.  So, from a criminal litigation 
perspective, it would be unwise for a team not to report the crimes. 
 
C.  DUTY TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT GUERILLAS’ WAR CRIMES 
Similar to the duty to report, a SOF team has no general legal duty to intervene to 
prevent the guerillas’ war crimes if they acquire knowledge of the guerillas’ criminal 
purpose and intent after delivering the military aid.  This general duty derives from 
 
35 Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E, supra note 2; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, (March 28, 2002); 
Ethical Dilemmas for Special Force, supra note 2. 
36 10 USC § 892 (2000). 
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command responsibility theory as one of its elements.  But as stated, without effective 
control, a SOF team will not likely be liable under that theory.  Further, the duty to 
intervene is not part of the aiding and abetting type theories for war crime culpability.  
None include a failure to meet this duty as an affirmative element to support a charge.  
Rather, the duty to intervene would only arise in a trial in the context of a defense 
strategy that attempts to negate charges of aiding and abetting or to prove that the 
defendants broke off from a conspiracy before the crime occurred. 
 This does not mean to imply that a SOF team should intervene because of the 
potential need to disprove an aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise, or conspiracy 
charge.  After all, a team’s safety and survival could be threatened or in peril by physical 
intervention against the guerillas.  Self-defense and reality might dictate that the prudent 
military option is to detach and withdraw from the guerillas.  Of note, criminal 
responsibility for war crimes generally excludes reasonable self-defense.37 
Further, a SOF team’s mission might not include intervention.  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces considered this issue in the context of non-SOF or 
conventional soldiers in United States v. Rockwood.38 Captain Rockwood was a 
counterintelligence officer on the staff of Joint Task Force (“JTF”) 190 during the U.S. 
operations in Haiti in 1994.  On September 30, 1994, he left his place of duty at the Light 
Industrial Complex in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and went to the National Penitentiary to 
conduct an inspection and to intervene to protect prisoners.  He had heard rumors that the 
 
37 See,e.g., The Rome Statute, supra note 17 at art. 31(1)(c). 
38 Rockwood, 52 M.J. 98; Major Edward J. O’Brien, Note, The Nuremburg Principles, Command 
Responsibility, and the Defense of Captain Rockwood, 149 Milit L Rev 275 (Summer, 1995). 
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local Haitian soldiers and police were abusing, torturing, and killing prisoners there.  
Captain Rockwood was charged with several violations of the UCMJ, including leaving 
his place of duty.  In his defense, he argued justification - that his command was 
criminally negligent by not protecting Haitian prisoners from alleged human rights 
abuses and that he would have been criminally responsible for war crimes if he had failed 
to intervene.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected his argument: 
Appellant cites us to no legal authority – international or domestic, 
military or civil – that suggests he had a “duty” to abandon his post in 
counterintelligence and strike out on his own to “inspect” the penitentiary.  
Neither does he suggest any provision of any treaty, charter, or resolution 
as authority for the proposition.  . . . In this circumstance, we conclude that 
the military judge did not err in declining to provide a justification 
instruction.39 
The court noted that the alleged abuses were done by Haitian soldiers, not American 
soldiers under the command of JTF 190.  It further opined that the United States was not 
an occupying power of Haiti with any regional duty to control Haitian forces.  Finally, 
the court considered that the JTF 190 staff had no actual knowledge of atrocities and that 
Captain Rockwood’s investigation and intervention placed him in personal danger 
because of the unstable security situation in Port-au-Prince.  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that Captain Rockwood had no general legal duty to investigate rumors of 
atrocities by Haitian forces or to intervene to prevent any because there was no potential 
threat of a war crimes conviction.  And it upheld Captain Rockwood’s conviction, ruling 
that his investigation and intervention concerning rumored atrocities were not part of his 
assigned mission in Haiti. 
 
39 Rockwood, 52 M.J. at 108. 
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As in Rockwood, a SOF team should intervene to prevent guerillas’ war crimes 
only as directed by higher military authority or within the parameters of its assigned 
mission.  The decision to do so raises strategic military issues outside of any general legal 
duty implicit in a potential war crimes prosecution.  Intervention might be a departure 
from the team’s assigned mission and could therefore have larger strategic implications.  
As stated, it might also cause team members to be injured or killed.  This might also 
affect the larger strategic purpose of the team’s presence. 
 Although a SOF team has no general legal duty to intervene, they are required by 
training and operational orders always to attempt to use less than physical means to 
influence the guerillas not to commit war crimes.  As previously noted, SOF teams must 
state clearly to the guerillas at their first meeting that all U.S. military support will be 
withdrawn if the guerillas commit war crimes.  This scenario is a key part of the live 
scenario training that all SOF candidates undergo - “Robin Sage” training.  In these 
scenarios, SOF candidates work through scenarios in the field where SOF instructors and 
actors play the parts of guerillas that challenge the SOF candidates’ ethics by vaguely 
indicating intentions to commit atrocities.  The training poses the dilemma as to how the 
threat of withdrawing military aid is communicated.  After all, it can be done absolutely 
or with intonations of willful ignorance.  For example, one could say, “We cannot know 
of any war crimes or the United States will withdraw military aid.”  Robin Sage training 
is designed to test the personal honor and integrity of SOF candidates to ensure that the 
threat of withdrawal is properly communicated.  In any event, as already discussed, a 
SOF team may not be violating a general legal duty under the law of armed conflict by 
improperly communicating the threat of withdrawal of aid.  But a court might infer that a 
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SOF team had actual knowledge of the guerilla’s war crimes and even shared their 
criminal purpose from a team’s willful ignorance if the circumstantial evidence of such 
crimes is self-evident. 
 
D.  DUTY TO DETACH AND WITHDRAW MILITARY AID 
A SOF team does have a general legal duty to detach and withdraw further 
military aid from guerillas if the team has actual knowledge that the guerillas have a 
criminal purpose to commit war crimes.  If it does not do so, then a team might be held 
criminally liable under aiding and abetting type theories for any war crimes later 
committed by the guerillas.  As in Kvocka, a court might infer that a team shared in the 
guerillas’ criminal purpose and intent based on its continued assistance to them. 
 This duty might be modified if a SOF team acquires actual knowledge of past 
guerilla war crimes and has bona fide assurances from the guerillas that they are 
prosecuting the perpetrator and will not commit future ones.  In such a scenario, it seems 
unlikely that a court would infer that a team shared in the guerillas’ criminal purpose if 
the guerillas later committed crimes. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the context of this essay’s factual scenario, Special Operations Forces have no 
general legal duty under the law of armed conflict to investigate the guerillas’ past war 
crimes or to intervene to stop their future ones.  They might have strong moral, ethical, 
and even practical motives to do so.  And higher military authority might even order them 
to do so.  But their failure to act on these motives does not turn SOF team members into 
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war criminals.  Nevertheless, a SOF team does have a general legal duty to detach from 
and not to aid guerillas in the commission of future war crimes.  This requires actual 
knowledge of the guerillas’ criminal purpose and intent.  And a team could be held 
criminally responsible for the guerillas’ war crimes if it breaches this duty. 
 Certainly, the real life scenarios that SOF teams encounter during operations will 
likely vary from the academic hypothetical posed in this essay.  The personalities of 
guerilla groups and the nature of missions might also affect the degree that a SOF team 
can influence or the guerillas actions.  Further, depending on the role of the United States 
as an occupying power or not, a team may even reach the point of “effective control” 
over a guerilla group depending on assigned mission and other facts.  This goal of this 
essay was merely to analyze one of the more common scenarios. 
Given the myriad of other possible scenarios, it is therefore imperative that 
commanders and legal advisors for SOF units provide appropriate policy and legal 
guidance that addresses the legal issues discussed in this essay.  Such guidance should 
provide SOF team members with clear courses of action if they suspect that guerillas 
committed war crimes and will continue to do so.  Further, it should include all legal and 
regulatory duties without disturbing a military commander’s discretion over purely 
strategic and tactical issues.  Based on the conclusions of this essay, such guidance might 
consist of the following: 
1. Report all information to higher authority; 
 
2. Attempt to influence or intervene to prevent the war crime, but only as 
practicable within the limits of the mission and your own safety; 
 
3. If unsuccessful, separate, detach, and disengage from the guerillas and from 
providing any further military aid; and 
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4. Await further guidance from higher authority. 
 
It is significant to note that two of the four guidance items point to higher level 
authority.  The obligations of policy level leaders are beyond the scope of this essay and 
would be worthy topics for another one.  But it should be noted that reports of guerilla 
war crimes to policy level leaders could implicate the same Law of Armed Conflict 
obligations that apply to SOF teams in the field - certainly if the reports establish the 
guerillas' criminal purpose and intent.  Similar to SOF teams’ actions, policy leaders also 
risk becoming liable for guerilla war crimes if they indulge in willful blindness or 
deception concerning their actual knowledge of guerilla conduct.  Accordingly, just as 
SOF teams are well-advised to report guerilla crimes, policy leaders are well-advised to 
closely read and quickly react to such reports - or to similar reports from other sources. 
As such, the above guidance is an appropriate starting point for reactions 
to guerilla war crimes, regardless of the level of authority over an operation.  At the SOF 
team level, it is the author’s experience that this guidance has traditionally been provided 
in all deployments – typically by the unit’s judge advocate.  One always hopes for the 
best in preparing for a military deployment.  But it is always the best course of action to 
prepare for the worst.  
